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In the light of the instant decision, there is little chance that any act
committed during the perpetration of a felony will not be considered
an act done with a conscious disregard for life and likely to result in
death. It is hard not to agree with Justice Peters that the decision in
Taylor in effect "reinstates the felony-murder rule in cases where the
42
victim resists and kills.1

Remy J.Ferrario
PAROLE-DuE

PROCESS-INADMISSIBLE

EVIDENCE-THE

EXCLU-

SIONARY RULE Is NOT APPLICABLE IN A PAROLE REVOCATION PROCEEDING. United States ex. rel. Sperling v. Fitzpatrick, 426 F. 2d 1161

(2d Cir. 1970).
Appellant was a mandatory releasee from federal prison. While on
parole he was searched by two New York City policemen. Based upon
evidence acquired from the search appellant was indicted in Supreme
Court, New York County. The court dismissed the indictment after
upholding a motion to suppress the evidence as unlawfully obtained.
Shortly thereafter the federal parole board issued a warrant for the
retaking of appellant, because of his confrontation with the New York
police. At the parole revocation hearing, conducted by an examiner
designated by the parole board, the unlawfully obtained evidence was
received over appellant's objection. The parole board revoked parole.
Appealing from a dismissal of a petition for writ of habeas corpus,
appellant contends that the fruits of an unlawful search cannot be
used to prove a violation of parole. Held-Affirmed. The exclusionary
rule is not applicable in a parole revocation proceeding.
Denial of due proces to federal parolees initially occurred in 1935
with Escoe v. Zerbst.1 Appellant's probation was suspended without a
revocation hearing.2 In his writ of habeas corpus appellant claimed
that his constitutional rights had been invaded.3 The Supreme Court
ordered his release, holding that the revocation was void because of
non-compliance with the probation statute4 which required a hearing
prior to revocation. The Court considered appellant's contention
that as a probationer his constitutional rights had been transgressed
and said:
Than The Felon-People v. Harrison (Cal. App. 1959); People v. Wood (N.Y. 1960), 48
CAL. L. REv. 847, 849 (1960).

42 Taylor v. Superior Court of Alameda County, 91 Cal. Rptr. 275, 280 (Cal. 1970).
1 295 U.S. 490, 55 S. Ct. 818, 79 L. Ed. 1566 (1935).

21d. at 491, 55 S. Ct. at 819, 79 L. Ed. at 1568.
8 Id.at 492, 55 S. Ct. at 819, 79 L. Ed. at 1568.
443 Stat. 1260; 18 U.S.C. § 725 (1925).
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In thus holding we do not accept the... contention that the privilege has a basis in the Constitution. 5
The effect of this dicta has been twofold: the parolee has no rights
under the Constitution, and the federal courts accept Escoe as authority
to deny a parolee the right of due process.6 As a result the federal parolee became a second-class citizen without the protection of due
7
process.
It was not until 1950 that a federal court reconsidered the dictum
of Escoe and held a parolee entitled to Constitutional rights. In Martin
v. United States a fede:ral probation officer made detailed investigations
of probationers suspected activities.8 Searches of his property were
conducted without a warrant. The court said that the fourth amendment of the Constitution protects all persons to include probationers
against unreasonable search and seizures.9 It appears that the effect
of this case was very limited' ° and it was not until Brown v. Kearney
that another positive application of due process to parole revocation
arose.'" The court in a per curiam decision ruled that "a parolee is
entitled to constitutional protection for illegal search and seizures."' 2
In application of this ruling the court declared that the parole board
may not entertain "evidence of this nature when conducting revocation proceedings."' 3
Even though the majority of courts saw due process as inapplicable
to federal parole revocations, a somewhat "analagous" protection arose
with the concept of "basic fairness." This concept was designed to restrain the parole board in the exercise of its broad discretionary powers.
In Hyser v. Reed five parole revocation proceedings were consolidated
on appeal and in each case due process was held not to apply.14 The
5295 U.S. 490, 492, 55 S. Ct. 818, 819, 79 L. Ed. 1566, 1568 (1935).
6 Comment, Rights Versus Results: Quo Vadis Due Process for Parolees, 1 PAc. L.J. 321
(1970).
7 Probation and parole revocation are governed by the same procedural requirements.
"Congress, which is the source of both these penological devices has given no indication
that the revocation of parole should be more difficult or procedurally different than revocation of probation." Hyser v. Reed, 318 F.2d 225, 236 (D.C. Cir. 1963), cert. denied sub
nom. Jamison v. Chappell, 375 U.S. 957, 84 S. Ct. 447, 11 L. Ed.2d 316 (1963).
8 183 F.2d 436 (4th Cir. 1950), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 904, 71 S. Ct. 280, 95 L. Ed. 654 (1950).
9 Id. at 439.
10In 1961 the right to have counsel offered to a parolee was recognized in Glenn v.
Reed, 289 F.2d 462 (D.C. Cir. 1961). However, this recognition was limited to the right to
have counsel provided the parolee retain one, not "that the presence of counsel is mandatory whenever a parolee appears before the Board or that parole revocation proceedings
were to become adversary proceedings." Hyser v. Reed, 318 F.2d 225, 238 (D.C. Cir. 1963),
cert. denied sub nom. Jamison v. Chappell, 375 U.S. 957, 84 S. Ct. 447, 11 L. Ed.2d 316
(1963).
11 Brown v. Kearney, 355 F.2d 199 (5th Cir. 1966).
12 Id. at 200.
1l Id.
14 Hyser v. Reed, 318 F.2d 225 (D.C. Cir. 1963), cert. denied sub nom. Jamison v. Chap-

pell, 375 U.S. 957, 84 S.Ct. 447, 11 L. Ed.2d 316 (1963).
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court did find however, a rationale to support the implementation of
restraint upon parole revocation proceedings, without altering the
Escoe dicta. The court reasoned that the parolee's rights rest solely with
the statute granting his conditional freedom; and there had to be
either an absence of compliance with the parole statute 15 or an abuse
of discretion by the board to justify any judicial intervention on behalf of the parolee. The rationale behind this reasoning is evidenced
by the statement, "The statutory scheme developed by Congress over
many years intended that some safeguards be provided and that Congress left it to the board and the courts to shape such procedures."' 6
Hyser appears to be antithetical to the basic provisions of the firmly
established Escoe dicta; because one could easily surmise that "basic
fairness," however limited, would encompass some degree of constitutional protection for the parolee. However, Hyser's "concept of basic
fairness" actually adds but another obstacle to the parolee's claims of
due process. Because the court in Hyser chose to place "basic fairness"
under the rigidly structured parole statutes and not under any constitutional provisos, 17 the parolee's rights of due process protection were
again redenied in accordance with Escoe.
The instant case of Sperling v. Fitzpatrick' brings face to face an
almost insurmountable collection of judicial precedent denying constitutional due process to a parole revocation hearing with "a massive
re-examination of criminal law enforcement procedures on a scale
never before witnessed."' 9 The Second Circuit Court of Appeals in
a case of first impression, considered the parolee's contentions that
unlawfully obtained evidence could not be used against him in revoking his parole.20 The court unequivocally held in keeping with
all prior decisions that: "the exclusionary rule is not applicable in a
parole revocation proceeding. ' 21 This ruling, by all standards, would in
and of itself establish the traditional precedent for the Second Circuit
by denying parolees any due process consideration in the revocation
proceeding. However, the court went a step further and added to this
holding the following:
The Parole Board is thus vested with the broadest discretion conwith due process to act upon reliable evidence in revoking
sistent 22
parole .

15 18 U.S.C. § 4205-07 (1964).
16 318 F.2d 225, 246 (D.C. Cir. 1963), cert. denied sub nom. Jamison v. Chappell, 375
U.S. 957, 84 S. Ct. 447, 11 L. Ed.2d 316 (1963).
17 Id. at 243.
18426 F.2d 1161 (2d Cir. 1970).
19 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 523, 86 S. Ct. 1602, 1653, 16 L. Ed.2d 694, 751 (1966).
(Justice Harlan's dissenting opinion).
20 United States ex. rel. Sperling v. Fitzpatrick, 426 F.2d 1161, 1163 (2d Cir. 1970).
211d. at 1163.
22 Id. (emphasis added).
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It is the addition of the phrase "consistent with due process" that
establishes Sperling as an unprecedented hybrid. It appears that the
court has attempted to establish constitutional guarantees of due process for the parolee and at the same time effectively denied petitioner
these rights by its holding. The court in a subtle use of authority has
undoubtedly taken the Martin and Brown exceptions to the Escoe
dicta and established a viable precedent to be used in future cases
of this nature. 23 It appears that the court in Sperling entertained
thoughts of ruling in favor of due process for parolees, but decided that
a ruling of this nature would be premature because "it would tend
' 24
to obstruct the parole system in accomplishing its remedial purposes
and it would force the parole officers "to spend more of their time
'25
personally gathering admissible proof.
The effect of the court's recognition of due process is to provide
a basis for future applications of constitutional protection to parole
revocation proceedings. 'This is a progressive decision that can lead the
way for much needed corrective procedures.
Edward Raymond Woolery-Price
23 Hyser firmly stands for the established proposition that constitutional due process
does not apply to a parole revocation hearing. Hyser's denial of due process specifically
included evidentiary questions when that court said:
As to the constitutional claim, it is sufficient to note that the Parole Board is not
bound by the rules of evidence in considering information relating to parole violations.
However, the Sperling holding is not contrary to the recognition made in Martin and
Brown that the parolee does have rights under the Constitution, but the court determined
that Martin and Brown were limited to incidents involving police harassment.
24 Id. at 1163.
25Id. at 1165.
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